基督教对欧洲中世纪法学产生了什么影响?

基督教对欧洲中世纪法学产生了什么影响?
基督教对欧洲中世纪法学产生了什么影响?

基督教对欧洲中世纪法学产生了什么影响?
中世纪基督教思想家太多,说他们对法哲学的影响,实在难以尽数.不过在所有人里面对法哲学影响最大的莫过于阿奎那.
　　托马斯•阿奎那（Thomas Aquinas,1225～1274）,1230年起在家乡附近卡西诺山的本笃会修院受教育.1239年又进入那不勒斯大学学习.1244年入多明我会,但遭到家庭反对并被幽禁家中年余.1245年赴巴黎受业于大阿尔伯特.1248年随大阿尔伯特同往科隆.1252年领受神职并在巴黎大学讲授圣经,1256年开始讲授神学和哲学,并得神学硕士学位.1259年回意大利,先后在教皇亚历山大四世、乌尔班四世、克雷芒四世的宫廷和罗马圣撒比拿的多明我会研究院中从事神学教学、研究和著述.1268年又到巴黎任教.1272年回那不勒斯大学任教.1274年应教皇格列高利十世之请赴里昂参加公会议,途中因病死于福桑诺瓦的西多会修院.主要著作有《反异教大全》（Summa Contra Gentiles）、《神学大会》（Summa Theologiae未完成）、《争论问题》以及圣经和亚里士多德著作的注释等.
　　他曾被同学称为“笨牛”（Dumb Ox）,这是因为他读书时显得“bulk,seriousness,and slowness”,看起来比较迟钝.但他后来成为基督教的最伟大思想家之一.
　　阿奎那根据亚里士多德的一些观点提出,法是对于公共幸福事项的合理安排,由管理社会的人予以公布.
　　西塞罗将法定义为（In Plato’s De Republica）：True law is right reason in agreement with Nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting. 照此,阿奎那搭建了四重法哲学结构,将法律分作永恒法（Eternal Law ）、自然法(Natural Law) 、神法（divine law）和人法（human law）4 种, 构成一个等级体系.
　　①永恒法（eternal law）代表神（God,基督教的上帝）的理性和智慧,是神支配整个宇宙的法律.其他一切法律只要与真正理性一致,总是来自永恒法,所以它是最高的法律.
　　②自然法（natural law）是理性动物即人“参与永恒法”的产物,是“神的荣光”在人的身上留下的痕迹,是沟通神人的桥梁,是人类根据神所赋予的理性对永恒性的不完全的认识,是神用以支配人类的法律.自然法最基本的原则是“行善避恶”,包括力求自存、结成婚姻关系和养育后代,希望了解神的真理,参加社会生活等内容.
　　③神法（divine law）即宗教法,其所涉及的是每一个个体的人欲实现永恒救赎而必须履践的戒条.当然,一个人也不能仅凭自己的理性去发现神法,神法戒律的“发现”只能通过神秘的天启（divine revelation）.是神通过《圣经》赋予人们的法律,用以发展并补充较抽象的自然法.
　　④人法（human law）即世俗统治者制定的法律.
　　美国著名法哲学家Kenneth Himma教授对自然主义法理学以及阿奎那的法哲学思想评介如下：
　　II. Classical Natural Law Theory: Two Species. At the outset, it is important to distinguish two kinds of theory that go by the name of natural law.
　　A. Qua Theory of Morality. The first is a theory of morality that is roughly characterized by the following theses.
　　1. Moral principles are objective. Moral propositions are the bearers of objective truth-value; that is, moral propositions can be objectively true or false (i.e., true or false independently of what people believe about them).
　　2. Moral principles are derived from the nature of human beings.
　　3. Moral principles are rational.
　　4. Moral principles are discernable by human reason and hence knowable by human beings. It is in part for this reason that human beings can be held accountable for their behavior under the natural law.
　　5. Moral principles are promulgated by, or otherwise owe their existence to, God. Most natural law theorists hold this view, but not all; while natural law moral theory is the official theological morality of the catholic church, there are some natural law theorists who are atheists (most recently, Michael Moore).
　　B. Qua Theory of Law. But there is another kind of natural law theory having to do with the conceptual relationship of morality to law. According to natural law theory of law, the concepts of law and morality are related in the following way: there are at least some laws that depend for their “authority” not on some pre-existing human convention, but on the logical relationship in which they stand to moral standards. Otherwise put, some norms are authoritative in virtue of their moral content, even when there is no convention that makes moral merit a criterion of legal validity.
　　It is worth noting that the two types of theory are logically independent of each other. One could accept either theory and deny the other. Indeed, one could even be an ethical relativist on morality and a natural law theorist on law. On this admittedly strange view, there cannot be unjust laws – but what counts as unjust is determined by the conventional standards that people in the culture accept. I don’t know of anyone who accepts this view. Conversely, and more likely, one could accept a natural law theory of morality without holding that the natural law theory of legality. And here it is worth noting that lots of positivists, as we will see, are objectivists about morality.
　　C. Aquinas’s Analysis of Law. Aquinas takes the notion of law to be central to all normative practices – not just legal practices – including morality; and he gives a general analysis of the concept as it figures in all forms of law (again, including the natural law). The theory can be summarized in the following analysis:
　　A rule R is a law if and only if 1) R is a directive of reason; 2) R is aimed at the common good; 3) R is promulgated; 4) R requires or prohibits certain actions; 5) R is backed by coercive power; and 6) R is intended to be obeyed.
　　It is important to notice that all 6 of these conditions must be satisfied for a rule to be law. Thus, to put it another way, each one of these conditions is a necessary condition for law; and no one of these conditions alone is a sufficient condition. However, satisfaction of all 6 guarantees that a rule is a law and hence the 6 conditions taken together are jointly sufficient for law.
　　D. Types of Law. On Aquinas’s view, there are four types of law: eternal, divine, natural, and human.
　　1. Eternal law. The set of timeless truths that govern the movement and behavior of all things in the universe, including non-human things. The eternal law is determined by the decisions that God has made regarding the construction and character of the created universe.
　　2. Natural law. That portion of the eternal law that applies to the behavior of human beings, which is, as we have seen, governed by human nature;.
　　3. Human law. Law that “purports” to have a human source.
　　4. Divine law. The law that pertains to “our last end” – which presumably refers to our ultimate fate after divine judgment. Presumably, Aquinas would hold that the divine law is primarily revealed in the New Testament.
　　D. The Distinguishing Thesis of Classical Natural Law Theory: The Conceptual Relationship between Human Law and Natural Law. Here’s the way Aquinas describes it: “As Augustine says, ‘that which is not just seems to be no law at all’; wherefore the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice. Now, in human affairs a thing is said to be just from being right according to the rule of reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been stated above. Consequently, every human law has just so much of the nature of law is it is derived from the law of nature. But if, in any point, it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.”
　　As Blackstone puts the point: “This law of nature, being co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.” There are two interpretations of these passages – each suggesting a different relationship between law and morality.
　　E. A Criticism: This version of natural law has traditionally been rejected on the strength of Austin’s hangman argument. As Austin puts it: “Now, to say that human laws which conflict with the Divine law are not binding, that is to say, are not laws, is to talk stark nonsense. The most pernicious laws, and therefore those which are most opposed to the will of God, have been and are continually enforced as laws by judicial tribunals. Suppose an act innocuous, or positively beneficial, be prohibited by the sovereign under the penalty of death; if I commit this act, I shall be tried and condemned, and if I object to the sentence, that it is contrary to the law of God, who has commanded that human lawgivers shall not prohibit acts which have no evil consequences, the Court of Justice will demonstrate the inconclusiveness of my reasoning by hanging me up, in pursuance of the law of which I have impugned the validity. An exception, demurrer, or plea, founded on the law of God was never heard in a Court of Justice, from the creation of the world down to the present moment.”
　　Indeed, insofar as one allows for the conceptual possibility of truly wicked legal systems or laws, one is committed to denying the classical natural law thesis described above.